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FINANCING THE DEALER'S INVENTORY
The principal objective of inventory financing is to provide the
dealer with a line of credit to carry on his business. To achieve
this objective, it is necessary that the dealer have power to sell
the collateral, and to apply the proceeds to the purchase of other
goods. Since a sale of the collateral by the dealer to a bona fide
purchaser destroys the creditors security interest in those goods,' he
obviously will not permit such disposition unless given protection in
some other way Therefore, to satisfy the demands of both the dealer
and the financier, the security instrument must create what is termed
a floating lien. This device simply allows the creditors security
interest to transfer from the old goods to the newly-acquired inventory.
As subsequent discussion indicates, this method of financing presented
many legal problems before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, and ultimately resulted in an unfriendly judicial attitude toward
inventory financing. In attempting to alleviate this hostile attitude,
the drafters of the Code have adopted the general philosophy that all
security transactions should be made as simple and legally safe as
possible. In this respect, the single and simple security provided by
the Code is similar to that established by prior Kentucky law. Before
the Code, Kentucky recognized the essential sameness of purpose of
all the vaned security devices, and treated almost all security trans-
actions under chattel mortgage law 
2
I. FiNANcING A DEALER s INVENTORY PRIOR TO THE CODE
To show the importance of the changes made by the Code in this
field of security transactions, it is necessary to explore the prior law
upon which article 9 of the Code is based. The first part of this note,
therefore, is devoted to a summary analysis and evaluation of the
different devices previously used for financing a dealers inventory
Pledge
The parent of all devices for lending upon security of personal
property was the simple pledge.3 The use of this device required
that the debtor (pledgor) deliver possession of the goods to the
creditor (pledgee), that title to the goods remain in the debtor, and
I Uniform Commercial Code §9-307. The Code [hereinafter cited as UCC]
has been enacted into law as Chapter 355 of the Ky. Rev. Stat. Hereinafter this
note cites only the section number of the Code, omitting Ky. Rev. Stat.2 Knpke, Kentucky Moderrnzes the Law of Chattel Security, 48 Ky. L.J. 369
(1960).
8 Kentucky has long recognized the use of the pledge device. E.g., Bogard v.




that possession be relinquished by the creditor when the debt was
discharged. For three reasons, the requirement of possession in the
pledgee seriously limited the usefulness of this device for financing
inventory The transportation of the goods from the pledgor to the
pledgee and back was expensive to the borrower; the main purpose of
the dealers financing was destroyed when he relinquished possession
of the goods; and on many occasions it was impractical for the pledgee
to take possession, especially if it happened to be a bank or finance
company. This last reason was eliminated somewhat by the modem
documentary pledge,4 but the inability to overcome these other in-
adequacies led to a search for better devices for financing inventory
Chattel Mortgage
A chattel mortgage was simply a conveyance of title to the lender
to secure the debt until paid. Possession remained in the borrower,
and title revested m him when the debt was discharged. The fact
that the borrower could retain possession made this device superior
to the pledge for purposes of financing a dealers inventory But even
with this the chattel mortgage did not work well for the financing of
goods-m-motion. Its failure was caused mainly by two judicially-
created rules of law The first originated in Benedict v. Ratner 5 In
this case the United States Supreme Court held that if a creditor failed
to exercise dominion over the proceeds from the sale of his collateral,
he would lose not only his security interest in the proceeds, but also
his interest in the unsold goods and uncollected accounts. The Court
of Appeals of Kentucky adopted this rule.6 The effect was that the
dealer, without the use of the proceeds, was unable to replemsh his
inventory The second judicially-created rule, which invalidated all
after-acquired property clauses, further limited the effectiveness of
the chattel mortgage for financing a dealers inventory 7 An after-
acquired property clause permitted the creditors security interest to
transfer to the newly acquired goods.8 With these clauses invalid by
4 Warehouse receipts and bills of lading are examples of the documentary
pledge. With this device possession of the goods is taken by a bailee who issues
documents representing them. The goods are released by the bailee only on
presentation of these documents. The transfer of the document is equvalent to
investing possession in the pledgee and is sufficient for formation of a valid pledge.
Kentucky has recognized this as a security device. E.g., General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Sharp Motor Sales Co., 233 Ky. 290, 25 S.W.2d 405 (1930);
Douglas v. Peoples Bank of Ky., 86 Ky. 176, 5 S.W 420 (1887).
5268 U.S. 353 (1925).
6 Sandy Valley Grocery Co. v. Patrick, 267 Ky. 768, 103 S.W.2d 307 (1937).
7 E.g., Sandy Valley Grocery Co. v. Patrick, supra note 6; Loth v. Carty, 85
Ky. 591, 4 S.W 314 (1887); Ross v. Wilson, Peter & Co., 70 Ky. 29 (1869).
8 To achieve tls purpose, an after-acquired property clause provides that the
security interest presently created shall attach to goods acquired subsequent to
the agreement.
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law, the creditor could not permit the dealer to sell the goods and
retain the proceeds. In most states it was thought better to find more
flexible security devices for financing a dealer s inventory
Trust Receipt
The trust receipt, under prior law, was considerably more com-
plex than the chattel mortgage, primarily because it involved
three parties-the seller; the dealer, called the trustee; and the
finance company, called the entruster.9 It involved the following
procedure: (1) the manufacturer shipped the goods under a bill of
lading, with a draft for the price attached; (2) the financier honored
the draft, and took possession of the bill of lading; (3) the financier
then transferred the bill of lading to the dealer upon the execution of
two instruments, a note for the loan and a trust receipt in which the
dealer acknowledged that the goods belonged to the entruster; and
(4) the dealer presented the bill of lading to the carner and obtained
the goods. The trust receipt was very useful for the financing of
inventories consisting of relatively expensive items, such as auto-
mobiles and home appliances. The manufacturers of such products
usually demanded cash when the goods were shipped to the dealer.
Only rarely could the dealer sell his stock to the consumer for cash.
Faced with this dilemma, the dealer had to rely on a bank or a finance
company for the necessary funds to purchase goods for resale. This
prompted extensive use of the trust receipt. Kentucky recognized the
use of this security device, but held that it was governed by chattel
mortgage law 1o
As with the pledge and the chattel mortgage, there were certain
limitations on the use of the trust receipt for financing inventory First,
the trust receipt contemplated the purchase-money situation, and
could not be used to finance goods already in the dealer s possession."i
Because of this limitation, an automobile dealer could not finance his
used cars with the trust receipt. In this respect the trust receipt was
9 Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act thereinafter cited
as UTRA], adopted in about 30 states, but not Kentucky, it was generally held
that the trust receipt bad to be a tn-partite transaction. If title went from the
manufacturer to the dealer and then to the financier, rather than directly from the
manufacturer to the finance company, the transaction was treated as a chattel
mortgage and void against creditors, unless recorded. In re James, Inc., 80 F.2d
555 (2d Cir. 1929); In re A.E. Fountain, Inc., 282 Fed. 816 (2d Cir. 1922);
Arena v. Bank of Italy, 194 Cal. 195, 228 P. 441 (1924). UTRA §2(1)(b)(ii)
eliminated the reqmrement that title of the entruster had to be derived from
someone other than the trustee.
1o E.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. Wilson, 58 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1932); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp Motor Sales Co., 238 Ky. 290, 25 S.W.2d 405 (1930).
11 UTRA §2(1) (a), adopting the common law rule, provided that the goods
must have been delivered to the trustee by the entruster or some third person.
[Vol. 51,
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inferior to the chattel mortgage. A second limitation upon the trust
receipt was that it could not contain an after-acquired property
clause,' 2 thus each new addition to the dealer s inventory required the
issuance of a new trust receipt to the entruster.15 The decision of
Benedict v. Ratnerl a governed this transaction also. If the entruster
failed to exercise dominion over the proceeds, he could possibly lose
his security interest.14 In spite of these limitations the trust receipt was
superior to the chattel mortgage for financing stock-m-trade.
Field Warehousng
Earlier it was stated that the pledge was inadequate for financing
a dealers inventory for three reasons: (1) the transportation costs
were too expensive; (2) the dealer did not want to relinquish posses-
sion of the goods; and (3) the financier was usually unable to take
possession. Public warehousing solved the last problem by eliminating
the necessity of possession in the financier.' 5 The other two reasons,
however, were sufficient to impede the use of the pledge for financing
inventory To remedy this situation, there developed a method of
financing called field warehousing.16 This method required that the
borrower set aside part of his building for a warehouse, to be con-
trolled either by a third party warehouseman or by the lender. The
dealer then delivered part of his goods to the "warehouse" and
received warehouse receipts which he pledged to the bank for the
loan. In other words, field warehousing involved two transactions, a
bailment of goods with the warehouseman and a pledge of the receipts
with the financier. At first glance it appeared that this device
eliminated only the "transportation expense objection", removal of the
goods by the dealer required presentment of the warehouse receipts
12 Cases cited note 7 .supra.
13 This problem was alleviated somewhat by the UTRA. Under this statute,
the secured party, by filing a "statement of trust receipt financing" in the
Secretary of State s office, could avoid the necessity of filing each individual
receipt. UTRA §18(1) (4).
1a 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
14 The UTRA also changed this rule. After the sale of the goods the
entruster s lien attached to the proceeds, and he was entitled to prevail over
creditors who were subject to his security interest prior to the trustee s sale.
UTRA §10.
15 See note 4 supra.
1 0 See, e.g., Uion Trust Co. v. Wilson, 198 U.S. 530 (1905); Love v.
Export Storage Co., 148 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1906); In re Wyoming Valley Collieries,
29 F Supp. 106 (M.D. Pa. 1939). Although no cases have been reported in
Kentucky directly upholding field warehousing as a security device, the Court of
Appeals in Continental Can Co. v. Jessamine Canning Co., 286 Ky. 365, 150
S.W.2d 922 (1941), and Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky Glassworks Co., 20
Ky. L. Rep. 1089, 48 S.W 440 (Ct. App. 1889), nnplied that if there had been
an independent warehouseman with exclusive control over the goods the trans-
actions would have been upheld.
1962.1
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which were in possession of the bank. The most significant aspect of
field warehousing, however, and the one which distinguished it from
the documentary pledge, was that the dealer could remove the pledged
goods from the "warehouse" at any time, simply by replacing them
with other collateral of equal value. Thus the dealer, in effect, was
not deprived of possession of his inventory
A primary requirement of field warehousing was that the ware-
houseman have exclusive, open, and notorious control over the goods
in his possession. In Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand,17 and in
Union Trust Co. v. Wilson,18 the Supreme Court of the United States
established two factors which were necessary to constitute this control.
First, there had to be some notice to innocent third parties that the
goods were subject to a security interest, and second, the borrower
had to be excluded from access to the warehouse.19 Since this require-
ment of control by the lender, or by a third party, was characteristic
of any pledge, it was necessary for the Uniform Commercial Code to
continue the rule. The Code therefore provides that, "the require-
ments of possession [are not relaxed] where perfection of a security
interest depends upon possession of the collateral by the secured
party or by a bailee."20 The official comments to this provision make
it clear that this rule applies specifically to field warehousing. 21 The
effect of this provision, from the dealers point of view, is to reduce
the usefulness of field warehousing for financing inventory Since the
trust receipt now has all the advantages of the after-acquired property
clause,22 the necessity of moving the goods in and out of the warehouse
as the dealer needs them can be eliminated. From the financiers point
of view, however, field warehousing retains the advantage of permit-
ting credit extension in many cases where adequate security otherwise
would not be available. This is true because the field warehouse
receipt bars effective disposition of the collateral by the borrower,
whereas the chattel mortgage and trust receipt leave possession of the
17206 U.S. 415 (1907).
18 198 U.S. 580 (1905).
19 Closely related to the problem of "control" was the question of whether
the custodian of the warehouse could be an employee of the borrower. The
courts were split on this question, but the majority held that the receipts were
not invalid merely because an employee of the borrower was the warehouse
custodian. E.g., Philadelphia Warehouse Co. v. Winchester, 156 Fed. 600
(C.C.A.D. Del. 1907); Love v. Export Storage Co., 143 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1906).
In Continental Can Co. v. Jessamine Canning Co., 286 Ky. 365, 150 S.W.2d 922
(1941), the Court of Appeals decided that the warehouseman had to be a bona
fide, independent warehouseman, and that receipts issued by a custodian who
was also the borrower s employee were invalid.
20 UCC §9-205.
2 :1 UCC §9-205, comment 6.
2 2 UCC §9-204(3).
[Vol. 51,
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collateral in the dealer, who, by selling to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business, 23 can destroy the creditors security interest.
The only limitation on field warehousing for purposes of financing
inventory, both before and after the Code, is that it cannot be used
effectively by a dealer who must have all his inventory available for
sale at all times. It has been more useful to a dealer who deals in
goods of a seasonable nature, where it is convenient for him to store
part of his goods in the field warehouse during the off season, and
replace them with other goods as the seasons change.
Conditional Sale
Before the adoption of the Code the conditional sale was fre-
quently used to finance a dealer s inventory This device was simply
a sale in which the transfer of title depended upon payment of the
purchase price at some fixed time in the future. Possession was
transferred to the dealer at the time of the sale. The conditional sale
was used only in transactions where parties standing in the actual
relation of vendor and vendee desired to effect a credit sale. If used
to finance goods already in the dealers possession, or where there
existed a third party lender, the courts applied chattel mortgage law,24
which many times resulted in a loss to the secured party because of
his failure to record.2
5
At first, Kentucky courts refused to recognize the conditional sale,
and construed such contracts as passing title to the purchaser, leaving
the seller with a lien for the unpaid consideration.2 6 After adoption of
2 3 Under the common law, see, e.g., Bank of America Natl Trust & Say.
Assn v. National Funding Corp., 114 P.2d 49 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941), and
the UTRA, §9(2)(a), a purchaser, in order to qualify as a buyer in the
ordinary course of business, had to take the goods without notice of the security
interest and i good faith. The Code extends the protection afforded to a buyer
in the ordinary course of business to include a person who has actual notice of the
lenders security interest. Section 1-201(9) defines "buyer in the ordinary course
of business" as one who buys in good faith and without knowledge that the sale
is in violation of the security interest of a third person. Section 9-307(1) provides
that a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest
created by Ins seller even if he knows of its existence. Combining these two
provisions, it follows that "the buyer takes free if he merely knows that there
is a security interest which covers the goods, but takes subject if he knows, in
addition, that the sale is in violation of some term in the security agreement not
waived by the words or conduct of the secured party." UCC §9-307, comment 2.
The basic policy behind this protection is that inventory is intended for sale to
the consumer, and to facilitate commercial trade the secured party s interest is
made subordinate to that of the buyer in the ordinary course of business.24 E.g., In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929); Hughbanks, Inc., v.
Gourley, 120 P.2d 523 (Wash. 1941).25 E.g., Bryant v. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 214 U.S. 279 (1909); Hark-
ness v. Russell, 118 U.S. 663 (1886).
26 E.g., Taylor Motor Sales Co. v. Auto Ins. Co., 220 Ky. 6, 294 S.W 773
(1927); Fry Bros. v. Theobold, 205 Ky. 146, 265 S.W 498 (1924).
19621
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the Uniform Sales Act,27 the courts recognized conditional sales con-
tracts as instruments securing debts, and generally sustained their
terms respecting the reservation of title and repossession on default.
In spite of this fact, the conditional sale was given chattel mortgage
treatment; recordation was required for protection against subsequent
purchasers and creditors.28
II. FiNANCING A DEALER S INVENTORY UNDER THE CODE
Article 9 of the Code is not revolutionary legislation. It attempts
to eliminate from the law of commercial transactions the traditional
security devices, some of which have been described in the first part
of tis note, and to substitute in their place one very simple device
called the security agreement.
29
All the significant changes made by article 9 in the field of
inventory financing are related to the validation of the floating lien by
section 9-205. The floating lien is a continuing lien on the dealers
inventory which enables the borrower to sell the goods and to use
the proceeds to replenish his inventory Upon acquisition of the new
goods the creditors security interest "floats" from the old goods onto
the new The provisions of article 9 which make the floating lien
possible are:
1. section 9-205, which eliminates the rule of Benedict v. Ratner;
2. section 9-204(3), which provides for the after-acquired property
clause, and section 9-108, which provides that the security interest
in the after-acquired property is taken for new value rather than for
a pre-existing obligation;
3. section 9-204(4), wluch provides for future advances on present
security- and
4. section 9-312(5), which establishes the first-to-file and the first-
to-perfect priority rules.
Before the enactment of the Code, the floating lien was theo-
retically impossible, but the same result was accomplished with some
difficulty and unnecessary expense. To create a floating lien a
specified sum is loaned against the dealers present and after-acquired
inventory, with the dealer agreeing to keep the inventory-to-loan
ratio at a certain figure. Since the borrower, under pre-Code law, had
to account for all the proceeds immediately upon disposal of the goods,
the loan was necessarily self-liquidating. To illustrate, suppose A
agreed to finance X at the ratio of fifty per cent of inventory. A
2 7 Kentucky Acts 1928, ch. 148.
2
8E.g., Denkins v. Humphreys, 310 Ky. 344, 220 S.W.2d 847 (1949); Fields
Motor Co. v. Sturgill, 279 Ky. 47, 129 S.W.2d 1003 (1939); C.I.T. Corp. v. Short,
273 Ky. 190, 115 S.W.2d 899 (1938).
29 UCC §9-105(1) (h).
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loaned $2000 to X on a $4000 inventory On a certain day X sold for
$2000 inventory costing hun $1000. Benedict v. Ratner required that
the financier take these proceeds,30 whereupon the entire loan was
liquidated. X was entitled to a new loan of $1500 on his remaining
inventory of $3000. To secure this loan, the creditor had to file a new
chattel mortgage or issue a new trust receipt. This achieved sub-
stantially the same result as the floating lien but with considerable
mconvemence. The general policy of the Code in article 9 is to make
the floating lien more simple and less expensive.
Elimination of the Rule of Benedict v. Ratner
The principal purpose of the Benedict rule was to prevent fraud
by making all liens invalid where apparent ownership was "left" in the
debtor. The rule was limited to those situations where the debtor
remained in possession of the collateral. Under the Code, in all
situations where the debtor retains possession of the collateral,
recordation is required by the secured party in order for him to
prevail over subsequent creditors and buyers not in the ordinary
course of busmess.u1 This recordation provides a public record which
is available for use by all prospective creditors. The possibility of
fraud on subsequent creditors is eliminated by constructive notice,
thus the reason for the Benedict rule no longer exists. The rule itself
is expressly repealed in article 9.82
Notice that the repeal of this rule, however, does not necessarily
eliminate the need for policing the debtor to prevent dissipation of
all the collateral without liquidation of the debt. Section 9-205 does
nothing more than allow the secured party discretion in supervising
his collateral. This means that the security interest will not be invalid,
by law, simply because the debtor is given unfettered dominion over
the proceeds. When the financier gives possession of the collateral to
the dealer, he must, to a great extent, rely upon the dealer s honesty
and good faith. He must trust the dealer to comply with the contract
provisions regarding the proceeds of a dissipation. If this trust is
impractical, then the financier has only two alternatives. He can either
refuse to extend credit to the dealer, or can impose strict control
over the collateral.
After-Acquired Property
Before any security interest can be perfected in any type of
collateral there are four requirements which must be satisfied: there





must be an agreement between the parties; the creditor must give
value; the debtor must have rights m the collateral; and there must
be an act of filing, unless excused.3 3 This means that the secured
party s interest m after-acquired property does not come into existence
until the dealer has some rights in the inventory, i.e., until he receives
the goods. Aside from the fact that section 9-204(3) validates after-
acquired property clauses in those jurisdictions which had not pre-
viously done so, what change does it make m prior law? The only
significant change is the elimination of the necessity of filing a new
chattel mortgage or of issuing a new trust receipt upon the purchase
of new inventory Under the Code the security interest comes into
existence automatically upon receipt of the goods by the dealer.
The after-acquired property clause of section 9-204(3) does not
give the prior secured party any substantial advantage over subsequent
creditors. This is because the Code itself provides a definite escape
route from the effects of this provision. By qualifying as a purchase
money security holder,3 4 the subsequent creditor can prevail over the
prior security holder under section 9-312(3) as to the after-acquired
property The justification for this provision lies in the fact that it
gives the dealer an opportunity to acquire new inventory even though
he may have all his other property encumbered as collateral for other
loans.
The possibility of fraud or surprise on the prior secured party is
eliminated by section 9-312(3) (b). This provision requires the
purchase money security holder, in order to prevail, to give any other
secured party notice of his interest before the debtor receives posses-
sion of the new goods.35 From this analysis, it follows that the pur-
chase money security interest presents no great obstacle to financing
the dealer by the floating lien, so long as the financier sufficiently
polices the collateral and the proceeds from its sale. If he fails to
do this, he may find his debtors warehouse full of goods to which he
has a subordinate security interest.
Before an after-acquired property clause can be used effectively,
33 UCC §9-204(1) provides that a security interest cannot attach until there
is an agreement that it attach, value is given, and the debtor has rights in the
collateral. After the interest has attached, UCC §9-303(1) provides for the
additional step necessary for perfection.
34A purchase money security holder may either be a seller who takes the
security for the price of the goods or he may be a person who merely advances
money to the debtor to enable him to purchase inventory. The advanced money
must actually be used to purchase inventory. UCC §9-107.
35 The purchase money security holder is required to give notification only
to those secured parties whose interest is actually known to him and those who




the security interest in this property must be immunized against the
risk that it will be deemed a preference m bankruptcy Under section
60 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act 0 there is some question as to
whether or not the interest in the after-acquired property is for a pre-
existing debt, thereby constituting a preference. The Code attempts
to eliminate this possibility by providing that the interest m after-
acquired property shall be deemed to have been taken for new value.37
Future Advances
Article 9 provides that "obligations covered by a security agree-
ment may include future advances."38 The Code leaves some doubt
of the possible effect of this provision. If it means that the security
interest for the "future advance" takes priority from the time when
the original security interest was perfected, 9 the future advances
clause achieves its apparent purpose of putting everyone on notice
that the financier intends to make future advances on the collateral
described in the agreement. On the other hand, if the provision
means that the priority will not take effect until the future advance is
actually made,40 the clause will prove of little advantage to the floor
plan financier, except to eliminate the necessity of repetitious recorda-
tion every time a new advance is made. Since the four requirements
necessary for perfection of a security interest are not satisfied until the
advance is actually made,41 the latter construction seems the better
of the two. In addition, a security interest, by definition, is not created
until an obligation of the debtor comes into existence.42 Until the
future advance is made, the debtor is not obligated to the creditor in
any sense of the word.
Rules of Priority
There are two important rules of priority in regard to floor-plan
financing of the dealers inventory The first provides that where two
secured parties, each claiming an interest in the same collateral,
perfect their interests by filing, the first to file prevails regardless of
whether the other party was the first to make an advance or to com-
plete an agreement.43 In this situation the after-acquired property and
36830 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.s.c. §96 (1950).
ST UCC §9-108. For a full discussion of the preference mn bankruptcy prob-
lem, see Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Attempt by Secured Creditor Under
Article 9 to Emulate Trustee in Bankruptcy, 51 Ky. L.J. 154 (1962).
3s UCC §9-204(5).
39 See Spivack, Secured Transactions 32 (1960).
40 See Coogan, Article 9 of The Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors And The Floating Lien, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 852 (1959).
41 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
42 UCC §1-201(87).
43 UCC §9-312(5) (a).
KmNTucKy LAw Jou-ALV
the future advances clauses achieve their most effective result. Floor
plan financing can be used, giving the financier a security interest for
all present and future advances made on all the property, owned
presently or to be acquired.
The second rule provides that unless both secured parties perfect
by filing, the first to perfect prevails. 44 What effect can this have on
the floor plan financier? This can best be shown by a snple illustra-
thon. Assume that A filed a financing statement against X's inventory
four years ago, advancing at that time only $1000 but providing for a
future advances clause. Assume now that B advances $50,000 to X on
security of the same inventory and perfects his interest. Subsequent to
B's advance, A advances $50,000 to X under the prior security agree-
ment. If both parties perfect their interests by filing, A would have
priority under section 9-312(5) (a) for the entire $51,000. However,
if B does not perfect by filing but does perfect by some other method,
the question of priority, with respect to the two $50,000 advances,
depends upon the meaning to be given the Codes future advances
provision. If the provision means that the security interest for the
future advance relates back to the time when the original security
interest was perfected, then A would again prevail. On the other hand,
if the provision means that the security interest on the future advance
does not come into existence until the future advance is actually made,
B, being the first to perfect, would prevail. As stated earlier, the latter
seems the better interpretation. This means that the Code has pro-
vided a very sinple escape route from the future advances clause, just
as it has done with the after-acquired property clause by use of the pur-
chase money security interest. An intervening creditor, by intelligent
practice under article 9, can circumvent both of these innovations of
the Code, usually to the detriment of the floor plan financier.
CONCLUSION
The greatest contribution made by the Uniform Commercial Code
in the field of inventory financing is the elimination of the sharp
distinctions that previously existed among the various security devices.
For instance, the conditional sale was used when the financier was the
seller; the trust receipt could not be used in this situation. The chattel
mortgage was used for financing inventory already owned by the
dealer; the trust receipt was restricted to use for the purchase price
of newly acquired inventory The Code eliminates these distinctions
by providing for only one type of security device, the security agree-
ment.
44 UCC §9-312(5) (b).
[Vol. 51,
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The validation of the floating lien was also a substantial contribu-
tion. By its effective use, a financing agency can make available to a
dealer all of his needed capital secured by the dealer s present and
future inventory Such a result can be achieved if the secured party
uses the Code s flexibility, easing and strengthening his control over
the collateral as the credit risks fluctuate. If the financier cannot be
certain of the course of action his debtor might take, it is advisable
that he exercise stringent policing procedures over his collateral, rely-
ing lightly upon the after-acquired property clause or the future
advances clause for protection of his security interest.
Robert Lawson
